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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
City of Salt Lake 
Plaintiff/Respondent 
vs. 
Artis Brent Bulla 
Defendant/Appellant 
> Case No. 880075-CA 
I: Whether defendant's fifth amendment right was violated 
in an investigation of Salt Lake City Police Officers subsequent 
to a t raff ic violation. 
I I . Whether there were any proceedural e r rors requir ing 
reversal.I 
GCVERNDC UW 
United States Constitution; Article V. 
...nor sha l l be compelled in any cr iminal case to be a 
witness against himself, nor be deprived of l i fe f l iberty, 
or property without due process of law... 
Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 at 585 (1884) 
Coerced confession is one which "appears to have been made, 
e i t h e r in consequence of inducements of a tempora l 
n a t u r e . . . o r because of a t h r e a t or promise . . .which , 
operating upon the fears or hopes of the accused...deprive 
him of tha t freedom of w i l l or se l f - con t ro l e s sen t i a l to 
1 
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make h i s confession voluntary within the meaning of the 
law." 
Wilson vs. United States, 162 U.S. 613 at 623 (1896) 
In shor t , the t rue t e s t of a d m i s s i b i l i t y i s tha t the 
confes s ion i s made f r e e l y , v o l u n t a r i l y , and without 
compulsion QL inducement of soy sort/ ' 
Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444-445 (1966) 
"...if the individual i s alone and ind ica tes in any manner 
that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not 
question him." 
Utah Code of Criminal Proceedure 
77-35-19. Rule 19 — Instructions. 
(c).•.Notwithstanding a party's failure to object, error may 
be assigned to in s t ruc t ions in order to avoid a manifest 
injustice. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The facts are as follows: 
1. Defendant invoked Fif th amendment a t the beginning of 
the custodial interrogation as can be found in defendant's 
testimony. (T.) 
2. As pointed out in 7. of pg. 5, Respondent's brief, a 
pat-down search was made while I was hand-cuffed, long after 
I had invoked the f i f t h a t the beginning which s t i l l was 
total ly ignored by the officer. So this also was done over 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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my protest. Defendant asksf how was the Officer's pro-
tection insured by going through my wallet over my protest 
as stated by Mr. George in 7? So as per the statement in 7. 
this was compulsory testimony against myself, on the part of 
Officer Guest. His sole purpose for the search was to 
obtain information which I had refused to give him in the 
beginning, invoking my fifth-amendment right. 
3. The two warrants which Mr. George in 8., p. 5 in his 
brief referred to was eighteen dollars which I had remaining 
on a thirty dollar finef and the other was subsequently 
found by Justice Phyllis Scott to be of no merit and dis-
missed by her. So I am not the dangerous liar and felon 
that I am colored to be by the proceeding of the lower court 
and the so-called authorities. Also defendant denies making 
any statement in 8. 
4. The crucial "facts" (when I invoked the fifth, and John 
Paul Jones, vs. Paul Arthur Jones) established by the prose-
cution was on the basis of one witness only, and since his 
job depends on his adherance to proper police proceedure, 
his motive for not telling the truth in contradicting my 
testimony concerning the false information charge is mani-
fest. Being extremely arrogant in his conductf he plainly 
was punishing me for invoking my right, also. The jury, 
being over-awed by the manipulative power of the State, 
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int imidated by t h i s power, was therefor not impar t i a l in 
this deciding even matters of fact, because i t requires two 
witnesses to establish every word, not one. Therefor this 
subtle manipulation deprives me of my right to an impartial 
jury. Because an impar t ia l jury would have immediately 
determined that fact cannot be established on the testimony 
of one witness only, i t requiring two. No jury instruction 
was made by the referee, or judge, in this matter. Therefor 
I can only conclude tha t the whole proceeding i s geared to 
and in favor of the prosecution, because the sufficiency of 
witnesses—given the motive of the prosecution: the law-
enforcement growth industry—was over-looked by the presi-
ding judge. The cash register must keep ringing. 
5. Fact was established by the prosecution on the testimony 
of one witness , only, which was d i r e c t l y contradicted by 
defendant's testimony. Jury instructions on this failure of 
the prosecution to adequately establish fact was conspicous-
ly misssing, instead only stock in s t ruc t ions were used, 
which were not t a i l o r ed to defendant's t r i a l s i t ua t ion . 
Thus defendant was deprived of a fu l ly informed and 
impar t ia l jury by t h i s f a i l u re . The jury merely became a 
lever to be manipulated by the prosecution, in co l lus ion 
with the presiding authority, to obtain the desired result . 
6. Jury was dismissed whenever points of law were argued 
4 
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before the court, thus effectively further hampering and 
restricting the jury in their capacity to judge both law and 
facts. Notwithstanding defendant did not object, error was 
made, limiting the power of the jury, and thus depriving me 
of my right to an impartial jury trial as provided by the 
law of the land, which is the Bill of Rights of the Consti-
tution of the United States, Article VI. No rule-making, 
legislation, or fettered and manipulated "jury" (which has 
become a rubber-stamp for the assertions of the prosecu-
tion), may deprive me of this right. Therefor a manifest 
injustice was perpetrated, and though defendant may have 
failed to object, error was made which perpetrated this 
injustice. 
7. Where rights are concerned argumenst being tautological, 
citing to the record is not always necessary, in making 
legal arguments. 
REBUTTAL TO RESPONDENT SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
(1) As Respondent states in his brief: "The Fifth Amendment 
"Miranda" rights against self-incrimination which defendant re-
lies on are inapposite (irrelevant) given the facts of this case. 
.Miranda dealt with a post-arrest, station house interrogation 
over a substantial period of time." This is a very clever obfus-
cation of the fact that defendant did not rely on Miranda war-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
nings not being given, to prove that defendant was denied due-
process, but that a more basic law than Miranda was violatedf the 
fifth amendment to the United States Constitution, which was 
ignored by the policeman. The indicia of custody were present: 
handcuffs and police lights. 
(2) There was error committed by the court concerning 
sufficiency of witnesses and jury instruction which rendered the 
jury ineffective and rendering an impartial verdict through 
manipulation which abrogated jury nullification power. 
REBUTTAL TO ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MIRANDA WARNING IS NOT IN QUESTION, BECAUSE 
DEFENDANT ASSERTED HIS FIFTH AMMENDMENT RIGHT 
AT THE BEGINNING AND KNEW HIS RIGHT, 
INDEPENDANT OF WARNINGS DESCRIBED IN MIRANDA 
(1) Respondent 's argument i s spec ious from the o u t s e t , 
because the governing law in t h i s case i s not Miranda, but Ar t i c -
l e V, B i l l of Rights, United Sta tes Const i tut ion as amplified and 
commented on in Hopt v s . Utah, 110 U.S. 574 a t 585 (1884) and 
Wilson vs . United S t a t e s , 162 U.S. 613 a t 623 (1896) in which i t 
i s s t a t t h a t coerced confes s ion i s one which "appears t o have 
been made, e i ther in consequence of inducements of a temporal na-
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t u r e . . . o r because of a t h r e a t or promise . . .which, o p e r a t i n g upon 
the f e a r s or hopes of t he accused . . .depr ive him of t h a t freedom 
of w i l l or se l f -cont ro l e s sen t i a l to make h i s confession volunta-
ry within the meaning of the law." Wilson vs. United S ta tes , 162 
U.S. 613 a t 623 (1896): "In short , the t rue t e s t of a dmi s s ib i l i -
t y i s t h a t the confess ion i s made f r e e l y , v o l u n t a r i l y , and 
without compulsion .or inducement s £ any sort t "Miranda, as wel l , 
as c i t e d in de fendan t ' s b r i e f covers the whole ground, not j u s t 
s t a t i o n - h o u s e i n t e r r o g a t i o n , which respondent f a i l s to address: 
"Likewise, if the individual i s alone and indica tes in any manner 
t h a t he does not wish t o be i n t e r r o g a t e d , the p o l i c e may not 
q u e s t i o n him." Miranda vs . Arizona, 384 U.S. 534 a t 540-541. 
Lack of Miranda warnings i s i n c i d e n t a l because the F i f t h 
Amendment was abrogated by the Officer in h is subsequent ques-
t ioning and badgering, not Miranda. Miranda warnings are not in 
question here, because defendant asserted h i s r igh ts independant 
of prompt ings r e q u i r e d by Miranda. I t i s Hopt vs . Utah, not 
Miranda, and Ar t i c l e V tha t was violated by the off icer , and the 
Supreme Court r u l e s in t h i s m a t t e r . Miranda i s not even in 
question, because defendant had already asserted h is r ight inde-
pendant of being warned as required by Miranda, which asser t ion 
was f lagrant ly ignored by the off icer . 
A. NO ONE QUESTIONED AT ANY TIME IN THE 
PROCEEDING THE RIGHT OF THE OFFICER TO 
QUESTION DEFENDANT. THEREFOR THIS ARGUMENT IS 
ALSO POINTLESS AND AN OBVIOUS OBFUSCASTIQN OF 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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THE FACTS. 
No one questions the authority of the officer to question defen-
dant as c i t ed in 77-7-15. What seems to be in question by the 
prosecution, i s my r igh t not to be compelled by coercion to 
t e s t i f y against myself, which mere nobless obl ige , not j u s t 
compulsion, requires the great fiefdom of the City of Salt Lake 
to adhere to , the Fif th Amendment to the Const i tu t ion, not to 
mention Hopt vs. Utah and Wilson vs. United S ta tes . Either 
socie ty abides by the law of the land or i t does not. If so-
called authorities are free to break the law, and thereby become 
a uniformed mob to commit robbery under the mere color of law 
then we descend in to r igh t by mob, not r igh t by law. I regard 
this law-enforcement growth industry to be a serious imposition 
on the unalienable rights of an hitherto innocent public, v/hich 
makes the impositions of a King George pale in comparison,. If 
the fifth amendment i s so easily done away, then we may as well 
suspend the writ of habeus corpus, and every other right we have. 
Miranda says: "...if the individual i s alone and indica tes in 
any manner tha t he does not wish to be in ter rogated , the pol ice 
may not question him." Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 at 444-
445. Officer Guest in his zeal to assert his authority under 77-
7-15 ignored and trampeled upon and abrogated th is most fundamen-
ta l right guaranteed in the Constitution. Miranda warnings are 
not at issue, but the invocation of the fifth amendment as cited 
8 
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in defendant's brief. 
B. DEFENDANT DOES NOT BASE HIS ARGUMENT ON MI-
RANDA RIGHTS NOT BEING READ, BUT ON FIFTH 
AMENDMENT NOT BEING ADHERED TO BY POLICE 
OFFICER WHEN INVOKED, INDEPENDANT OF MIRANDA 
WARNINGS, WHICH WAS AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 
INTERROGATION. INDICIA OF ARREST WERE, ON 
THE CONTRARY, PRESENT. 
According to defendant testimony (T) fifth amendment was 
invoked at once, and then inquistorial and proceedural abuses 
were then entered into by the police officer for the space of 
half and hour. One can easily see when oneself is in that situation, that 
inquisitorial abuses were then directed against defendant, which 
are unconstitutional independant of Miranda, and it is not Miran-
da that was violated by the Officer, but the Constitution of the 
United States. In Hopt vs. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 at 585 (1884) 
Coerced confession is defined as one which "appears to have 
been made, either in consequence of inducements of a temporal 
nature...or because of a threat or promise...which, operating 
upon the fears or hopes of the accused...deprive him of that 
freedom of will or self-control essential to make his confession 
voluntary within the meaning of the law." 
Also, When the lights are flashing on a police vehicle, this 
is detention, no matter how brief. The defendant was therefor 
most definitely detained against his will. This custody was 
cemented when the handcuffs were produced before the pat down 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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search, and after the right against self-incrimination was in-
voked. The cit quoted from Miranda does not just deal with 
"reading of rights". This is not the issue. Reading of my 
rights was not necessary. Defendant knew his rights and asserted 
them at the beginning. Miranda covers the whole groundr not just 
"station-house" questioning. The cit I quoted deals with inqui-
sition after fifth amendment is invoked, not reading of rights I 
Justice Warren said the fifth amendment protected an individual 
before interrogation as well as during station- house interroga-
tion. He saidf "At this point he has shown that he intends to 
exercise his fifth amendment privilege." Therefore "any state-
ment taken after the person invokes his privilege (not after he 
is in the station-house!) cannot be other than the product of 
compulsion, subtle or otherwise." Likewise, if the individual is 
alone (not in a station house only) and indicates in any manner 
that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not 
question him." Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 534 at 474. No one 
questions the right of the police officer to question a suspect, 
but the right to swing a fist ends where my nose begins. The 
right of the policeman to question stops where fifth amendment 
(not Miranda) begins, else we have an inquistion with its train 
of abuses no matter where the site of this inquisition. Is a 
murder no longer a murder because of the site at which the mur-
der occurs? The right against self incrimination applys, not 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
j u s t in a s tat ion-house, but on a sidewalk as wel l . 
Respondent on p. 11 of h i s b r i e f a l s o s ays : " I t was not 
coe rc ion by the o f f i c e r s . . . " Defendant a s k s , what was i t then 
t ha t pryed open my l i p s , i f not coercion, "subtle or otherwise"? 
I n s t e a d of choosing t o remain s i l e n t , defendant chose i r o n i c a l 
statement instead, which the officer then twis ted to manufacture 
the fa l se information charge. (T). 
REBUTTAL TO POINT I I 
THERE WAS ERROR COMMITTED BY THE COURT 
CONCERNING SUFFICIENCY OF WITNESSES AND JURY 
INSTRUCTION WHICH RENDERED THE JURY 
INEFFECTIVE TO DELIVER AN IMPARTIAL VERDIOCT 
THROUGH MANIPULATION WHICH ABROGATED JURY 
NULLIFICATION POWER. 
Ju ry n u l l i f i c a t i o n or "Jury l a w l e s s n e s s i s t he g r e a t e s t 
correct ive of law in i t s ac tual administrat ion. The w i l l of the 
s t a t e a t l a r g e imposed on a r e l u c t a n t community, t h e w i l l of a 
majority imposed on a vigorous and determined minority, find the 
same o b s t a c l e in t h e l o c a l jury t h a t fo rmer ly confronted kings 
and m i n s t e r s . " U.S. vs . Dougherty, 473 F 2d a t 1130. The j u r y 
must be informed of t h i s nu l l i f i c a t i on power by the judge and not 
l i m i t e d i n i t s scope, because of t he in fo rmal c u l t u r a l sou rces 
which they must i n s t i n t i v e l y draw upon to render j u s t i ce . I t i s 
j u s t i c e the cou r t should be a f t e r , not a t ex t -book , d i c t i o n a r y 
d e f i n i t i o n def ined by the judge or p r o s e c u t i o n . Therefore the 
j u r y i n s t r u c t i o n : " . . . i t i s your duty as j u r o r s t o fo l low the 
law as the cour t s t a t e s i t t o you, r e g a r d l e s s of what you 
11 
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p e r s o n a l l y b e l i e v e t h e law i s or ought t o b e . " R. 1 8 - 3 2 f 
Ins t ruc t ion #2 as s t a t e d in the Respondent ' s b r i e f a b r o g a t e s 
d e f e n d a n t ' s r i g h t to an i m p a r t i a l j u ry f and a t r i a l by a j u r y of 
d e f e n d a n t ' s (not p r o s e c u t i o n ' s ) p e e r s . The weight of case law 
supports t h i s jury " lawlessness": 
The j u r y has the r i g h t to de te rmine the law as we l l as 
f a c t s . Georgia vs . Brailsfordr 3 Dallas 1, 1794. 
The j u r y has the power to b r ing in a v e r d i c t in the 
t e e t h of both law and f a c t s . Horning vs . D.C. 254 U.S. 
a t 1 3 5 r 138 ( 1 9 2 0 ) ; O l i v e r Wendel l Holmes. 
. . .or t h a t ex igen t c i r c u m s t a n c e s j u s t i f i e d the a c t i o n s 
of the accused, or for any reason which appeals to t he i r 
l o g i c or p a s s i o n , the j u ry has the power to a q u i t f and 
the c o u r t s must abide. . .U.S. vs . Moylin, 417 F 2d at 
1002r1006. 
The j u r y must be c o r r e c t l y i n s t r u c t e d by t h e r e f e r e e 
(presiding judge) so tha t they may be co r rec t ly apprised of t h e i r 
power of which they may be ignorant. But they were not only not 
i n s t ruc ted in t h i s n u l l i f i c a t i o n power, but they were wrongly 
ins t ruc ted in d i r ec t cont rad ic t ion to t he i r power as defined by 
the Supreme Court. 
I t may have been b e t t e r to have t i m e l y ob jec ted to t h i s 
i n s t r u c t i o n , but manifest i n j u s t i c e may be assigned despi te t h i s 
lack, and t h i s i s grounds for r eve r sa l . Rule 19 (c) U.R.C.P. 
12 
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The argument of respondent using Lemmon v. Denver on p. 13 of 
brief is also specious since defendant has always agreed that 
"Determination of facts is left exclusively to the jury," What 
defendant takes issue with is jury power to nullify law is also 
within their perogative which was unlawfully limited by the 
presiding judge. "The corollary the court is the determinor of 
the applicable law" is not upheld by the citations used by the 
respondent, the citations merely limit the power of the court, 
not the power of the jury: "The court shall not comment on the 
evidence..." (d) Rule 19 of U.R.C.P. 
CONCLUSION 
Fifth Amendent applys regardless of whether interrogation is 
custodial or non-custodial. Prosecution has failed to address 
this issue, but has preferred to couch their argument in Miranda 
warnings, which are irrelevant, since defendant asserted his 
right without such prompts, which invocation was ignored by the 
policeman. Procedural error was then made regarding jury 
instruction, and though defendant did not have the wit to object 
at the time, manifest injustice was assigned to the court. In 
addition, stock instruction was inappropriate because of 
insufficiency of witnesses for prosecution to establish any fact, 
of which the jury was to be the sole judge. Where rights are 
concerned argumenst being tautological, citing to the record is 
13 
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not always necessary, in making legal arguments. 
Respectfully submitted this 26th day of January, 1989 
Artis B. Bulla 
In Person 
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I, Artis B. Bulla, appellant, certify that on this date, August 
29, 1988, this brief was served to the following respondent: Don 
George, SLC Attorney. 
Dated this *9th day of jfjtquat, 1988. 
Artis B. Bulla, Appellant 
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